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Secure list decoding
Masahito Hayashi
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a new concept of secure list decoding. While the conventional list decoding requires
that the list contains the transmitted message, secure list decoding requires the following additional security
conditions. The first additional security condition is the impossibility of the correct decoding. This condition can
be trivially satisfied when the transmission rate is larger than the channel capacity. The other additional security
condition is the impossibility for the sender to estimate another element of decoded list except for the transmitted
message. This protocol can be used for anonymous auction, which realizes the anonymity for bidding.
Index Terms
list decoding; anonymous auction; security condition; capacity region
I. INTRODUCTION
Independently by Elias [1] and Wozencraft [2] as relaxation of the notion of the decoding process, list
decoding was introduced as the method to allow more than one element as candidates of the message sent
by the encoder. in the decoder. When one of these elements coincides with the true message, the decoding
is regarded as successful. In this formulation, Nishimura [3] obtained the channel capacity by showing its
strong converse part1. That is, he showed that the transmission rate is less then the conventional capacity
plus the rate of number of list. Then, the reliable transmission rate does not increase even when list
decode is allowed if the number of list does not increase exponentially. In the non-exponential case, these
results was generalized by Ahlswede [4]. Further, the paper [5] showed that the upper bound of capacity
by Nishimura can be attained even if the number of list increases exponentially. However, the merit of
the increase of the number of list was not discussed sufficiently.
In this paper, we propose a new concept of secure list decoding. To explain this protocol, we consider
the following anonymous auction scenario, which realizes the anonymity for bidding.M players participate
auction for an item dealt by Bob, and they have their distinct ID from 1 to M.
(i) (Bidding) A player, Alice bids with her ID M . Here, she sends M via noisy channel. Then, Bob
receives L ID numbers M1, . . . ,ML as the list. The list is required to contain her ID M .
(ii) (Purchasing) Assume that Alice’s bidding price is highest. She purchases the item from Bob by
showing her ID M .
This scenario has the following requirements.
(a) Bob wants to identify whether the person to purchase the item is the same as the person to bid
the highest price. That is, M needs to be one of M1, . . . ,ML.
(b) Alice wants to hide her ID M at the bidding step (i). Hence, she will not be identified by Bob
when she loses this auction.
(c) Bob wants to avoid the situation that two players show Bob correct ID at purchasing Step (ii).
That is, Alice cannot find another element among M1, . . . ,ML except for M .
The requirement (a) is the condition for the requirement for the conventional list decoding while the
requirements (b) and (c) are not considered in the conventional list decoding. In this paper, as a new
concept to satisfy these conditions, we propose secure list decoding by imposing the following two
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1The strong converse part is the argument that the average error goes to 1 if the code has a transmission rate over the capacity.
2additional conditions to the list decoding. The first additional security condition is the impossibility of
the correct decoding. This condition can be trivially satisfied when the transmission rate is larger than
the channel capacity due to the strong converse property. The other additional security condition is the
impossibility for the sender to estimate another element of decoded list except for the transmitted message.
In fact, we might use an authentication protocol to identify Alice [6]. In this case, if Alice gives the key
for the authentication to the third party, the third party can claim to Bob that he is also the winner of this
auction. To avoid this type of spoofing, we need to use ID number. That is, the above anonymous auction
scenario realizes a kind of authentication which satisfies the anonymity and forbids spoofing even when
Alice colludes the third party.
In this paper, we formulate secure list decoding, and define various types of capacity regions for secure
list decoding. Then, we calculate these capacity regions under some condition.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II-A gives the formulation of secure list decoding. Section
II-B explains the relation with bit commitment. Section IV prepares several information quantities. Section
IV states the main result by deriving the capacity regions. Section V shows the converse part, and Section
VI proves the direct part.
II. PROBLEM SETTING
A. Our setting
To realize the requirements (a), (b), and (c) mentioned in Section I, given a channelW from the discrete
system X to the other system Y , we consider the following protocol with integers L < M and security
parameters ǫA, δB, δC . For x ∈ X and a distribution on X , we define the distribution Wx and WP on Y
as Wx(y) := W (y|x) and WP (y) :=
∑
x∈X P (x)W (y|x). Alice sends her ID M ∈ M := {1, . . . ,M} via
noisy channel W with a code φ, which is a map fromM to X . Bob recovers the L messages M1, . . .ML.
The decoder is given by disjoint subsets D = {Dm1,...,mL}{m1,...,mL}⊂M such that ∪{m1,...,mL}⊂MDm1,...,mL =
Y . Then, we impose the following conditions.
(A) Verifiable condition.
ǫA(φ,D) := max
m∈M
ǫA,m(φ(m), D) ≤ ǫA (1)
ǫA,m(x,D) := 1−
∑
m1,...,mL:{m1,...,mL}∋m
Wx(Dm1,...,mL) (2)
(B) Non-decodable condition. There is no decoder {D˜m}m∈M such that
δB(φ) := min
D˜
M∑
m=1
1
M
δB,m(φ(m), D˜) ≤ δB (3)
δB,m(φ(m), D˜) := Wφ(m)(D˜m) (4)
In this paper, when a decoder has only one outcome as an element of M like {D˜m}m∈M, it is
called a single-element decoder.
(C) Non-cheating condition for honest Alice.
δC(φ,D) := max
m∈M
δC,m(φ(m), D) ≤ δC (5)
δC,m(x,D) := max
m′(6=m)∈M
∑
m1,...,mL:{m1,...,mL}∋m′
Wx(Dm1,...,mL). (6)
Now, we discuss how the code (φ,D) can be used for the task explained in Section I. Assume that Alice
sends her ID M to Bob by using the encoder φ via noisy channel W and Bob gets the list M1, . . . ,ML by
applying the decoder D as Step (i). At Step (ii), Alice show her ID M to Bob. Verifiable condition (A)
guarantees that M belongs to Bob’s list. Hence, requirement (a) is satisfied. Non-decodable condition (B)
3forbids Bob to identify Alice’s ID at Step (i), hence it guarantees requirement (b). In fact, if m is Alice’s
ID and there exists an element x0 6= m such that δC,m(x0, D) is close to 1, Alice can make the following
cheating. Since Alice knows that x0 belongs to Bob’s decoded list, she finds the third person whose ID is
x0. Then, she tells the third person this fact. At Step (ii), the third person can make spoofing by showing
Bob his/her ID. Since Non-cheating condition (C) forbids Alice such a cheating, it guarantees requirement
(c). Further, Bob is allowed to decode messages less than L. That is, L is the maximum number of Bob
can list as the candidates of the original message.
However, Condition (C) is the security evaluation for honest Alice who use the correct encoder φ.
Dishonest Alice might send her message by using a different encoder. To cover such a case, we impose
the following condition instead of Condition (C).
(D) Non-cheating condition for dishonest Alice.
δD(D) := max
m∈M
δD,m(D) ≤ δC (7)
δD,m(D) := max
x∈X
{
δC,m(x,D)
∣∣∣ǫA,m(x,D) ≤ 1
2
}
(8)
In the following, when a code (φ,D) satisfies conditions (A), (B) and (D), it is called a (ǫA, δB, δC)
code. Also, for a code (φ,D), we denote M and L by |(φ,D)|1 and |(φ,D)|2. Also, we allow stochastic
encoder, in which φ(m) is a distribution on X . In this case, for a function f from X to R, f(φ(m))
expresses
∑
x f(x)φ(m)(x).
B. Relation to bit commitment
If our task is realized and M = Fl2, we can approximately realize bit commitment as follows while it
is known that bit commitment can be realized by using noisy channel [7], [8], [9].
Assume that we have a (ǫA, δB, δC) code (φ,D) with sufficiently small security parameters ǫA, δB, δC .
Then, X , M , and Y are variables given in Section II-A with the code (φ,D). Also, we assume that M
is subject to the uniform distribution on M = Fl2. Since Bob cannot identify M , we have H(M |Y ) ≥
− log δB [10, Theorem 1][11, Lemma 5.9]. First, to choose a function f from M to F2. We choose
surjective homomorphic universal hash function F from M to F2 [13]. Then, the universal2 hash lemma
[12], [14], [15] guarantees that ǫ′ := I(F (M); Y |F ) is close to zero because H(M |Y ) is sufficiently large.
Now, we choose a surjective homomorphic hash function f from M to F2 such that I(f(M); Y ) ≤ ǫ′.
Alice has bit X = 0 or 1. Then, Alice randomly generates messages M ∈ f−1(X). Then, Alice sends
M to Bob via the above protocol in the binding phase. In the opening phase, Alice shows M to Bob.
Bob calculates f(M) and finds the value of X . If M does not belong to Bob’s decoded message list, Bob
consider that Alice makes cheating.
In this scenario, if Alice wants to make cheating, in the opening phase, she has to find another message
M ′ ∈ f−1(X⊕1) such thatM ′ belongs to Bob’s decoder’s list. However, it is impossible due to Condition
(D). Hence, the bit commitment is realized from the code for secure list decoding.
III. INFORMATION QUANTITIES
Consider the channel written as the transition matrix W from X to Y . For x ∈ X and a distribution on
X , we define the distribution Wx and WP on Y as Xx(y) := W (y|x) and WP (y) :=
∑
x∈X P (x)W (y|x).
Ex expresses the average with respect to a variable over the system Y under the distribution Wx and
Vx expresses the variance with respect to a variable over the system Y under the distribution Wx. This
notation is also applied to the n-fold extended setting.
4We define
C(W ) := max
P
I(P,W ), (9)
I(P,W ) :=
∑
x
P (x)
∑
y∈Y
Wx(y)(logWx(y)− logWP (y)), (10)
H(P ) := −
∑
x
P (x) logP (x), (11)
where the base of logarithm is 2.
For x, x′ ∈ X , we define
F (x, x′|P ) :=
∑
y
Ex(logWx′(Y )− logWP (Y )) = D(Wx‖WP )−D(Wx‖Wx′). (12)
Then, we define
ζ2(P ) := max
x 6=x′
max
x′′
F (x, x′′|P )− F (x′, x′′|P ) (13)
ζ1(P ) := min
x 6=x′
F (x, x|P )− F (x′, x|P ) = min
x 6=x′
D(Wx′‖Wx) +D(Wx‖WP )−D(Wx′‖WP ). (14)
In the following, we assume that
V := max
x,x′∈X
Vx(logWx′(Y )− logWP (Y )) <∞. (15)
For s > 0, we define
G(s, x|P ) := log
∑
x′∈X
P (x′)2sF (x,x
′|P ) (16)
G(s|P ) :=
∑
x∈X
P (x)G(s, x|P ). (17)
Since the function s 7→ G(s, x|P ) is strictly convex, the function s 7→ G(s|P ) is strictly convex. Hence,
we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: When Wx 6= Wx′ for x 6= x′, The value sI(P,W ) − G(s|P ) − H(P ) is negative and
continuous for s. It converges to zero as s goes to infinity. Also, sups>0−R1 + sR − G(s|P ) > 0 for
R1 < H(P ). 
Proof: Since F (x, x|P ) > F (x, x′|P ) for x 6= x′, we have
G(s|P ) =
∑
x
P (x)
(
logP (x) + sF (x, x|P ) + log
(
1 +
∑
x′ 6=x
P (x′)
P (x)
e−s(F (x,x|P )−F (x,x
′|P ))
))
. (18)
Hence, since
∑
x P (x)F (x, x|P ) = I(P,W ),
sI(P,W )−G(s|P )−H(P ) = −
∑
x
P (x) log
(
1 +
∑
x′ 6=x
P (x′)
P (x)
e−s(F (x,x|P )−F (x,x
′|P ))
)
< 0. (19)
When s→∞, the above value goes to zero.
Since −R1 > −H(P ), we have lims→0−R1+sR−G(s|P ) > lims→0−H(P )+sI(P,W )−G(s|P ) = 0.
Hence, due to the continuity for s, there exists s > 0 such that −R1 + sR−G(s|P ) > 0. Then, the proof
is completed.
5IV. MAIN RESULTS
A. Capacity regions
To give the capacity region, we consider n-fold discrete memoryless extension W n of the chan-
nel W . A sequence of codes {(φn, Dn)} is called strongly secure when ǫA(φn, Dn) → 0, δB(φn) →
0, δD(Dn) → 0. A sequence of codes {(φn, Dn)} is called weakly secure when ǫA(φn, Dn) → 0,
δB(φn)→ 0, δC(φn, Dn)→ 0. A rate pair (R1, R2) is strongly deterministically (stochastically) achievable
when there exists a strongly secure sequence of deterministic (stochastic) codes {(φn, Dn)} such that
1
n
log |(φn, Dn)|1 → R1 and 1n log |(φn, Dn)|2 → R2. A rate pair (R1, R2) is weakly deterministically
(stochastically) achievable when there exists a weakly secure sequence of deterministic (stochastic) codes
{(φn, Dn)} such that 1n log |(φn, Dn)|1 → R1 and 1n log |(φn, Dn)|2 → R2. Then, we denote the set of
strongly deterministically (stochastically) achievable rate pair (R1, R2) by Rs,d (Rs,s). In the same way,
we denote the set of weakly deterministically (stochastically) achievable rate pair (R1, R2) by Rw,d (Rw,s).
Theorem 1:
Rw,d ⊂ ∪PXU{(R1, R2)|0 ≤ R1 −R2 ≤ I(X ; Y |U), R1 ≤ H(X|U), 0 ≤ R1, 0 ≤ R2}, (20)
Rs,s ⊂ ∪PXU{(R1, R2)|0 ≤ R1 −R2 ≤ I(X ; Y |U), R1 ≤ H(X|U), 0 ≤ R1, 0 ≤ R2}. (21)

Theorem 2: A rate pair (R1, R2) is achievable when there exists a distribution P on X such that
ζ1(P ) > 0 and
0 < R1 −R2 < I(X ; Y ) < R1 < H(X). (22)

In fact, the condition R1 − R2 < I(P,W ) corresponds to Verifiable condition (A), the condition
I(P,W ) < R1 does to Non-decodable condition (B), and the conditions R1 < H(P ) and ζ1(P ) > 0 do
to Non-cheating condition for dishonest Alice (D). Theorems 1 and 2 are shown in Sections V and VI,
respectively. We have the following corollaries from Theorem 2, whose detailed derivations are given in
Section IV-B.
Corollary 1: When any distribution P with support X satisfies the condition ζ1(P ) > 0, we have
Rs,d ⊃ ∪PXU{(R1, R2)|0 < R1 − R2 < I(X ; Y |U), R1 < H(X|U), 0 < R1, 0 < R2}. (23)

Corollary 2: Assume that there is no distinct pair (x, x′) in X such that Wx = Wx′ . Also, we assume
that there exists P0 such that C(W ) = I(P0,W ) and supp(P0) = X . Then, we have
Rs,d ⊃ {(R1, R2)|0 < R1 − R2 < C(W ) < R1 < H(P0), 0 < R1, 0 < R2}. (24)

Combining Corollary 1 with Theorem 1 (Converse part), we have the capacity regions as follows.
Corollary 3: When any distribution P with support X satisfies the condition ζ1(P ) > 0,
Rs,s = Rs,d = Rw,d = ∪PXU{(R1, R2)|0 ≤ R1 − R2 ≤ I(X ; Y |U), R1 ≤ H(X|U), 0 ≤ R1, 0 ≤ R2}.
(25)

Notice that when |X | = 2, any distribution P satisfies the condition ζ1(P ) > 0, i.e., D(Wx‖Wx′) +
D(Wx′‖WP ) > D(Wx‖WP ). Hence, we have the capacity region.
6B. Derivations of corollaries
First, we prepare the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Given a joint distribution PXU , we have the Markov chain U − X − Y , which gives the
information quantities I(X ; Y |U) and H(X|U). Then, we have
∪PXU {(R1, R2)|0 < R1 − R2 < I(X ; Y |U) < R1 < H(X|U), 0 < R1, 0 < R2}
= ∪PXU {(R1, R2)|0 < R1 − R2 < I(X ; Y |U), R1 < H(X|U), 0 < R1, 0 < R2}. (26)

Proof: Since the relation ⊂ is trivial, it is sufficient to the relation ⊃. That is, given a distribution PXU
and the pair (R1, R2) such that 0 < R1 − R2 < R1 < I(X ; Y |U), it is sufficient to show the existence
of a distribution P ′XU such that 0 < R1 − R2 < I(X ; Y |U) < R1 < H(X|U). There exists a distribution
P ′′XU such that I(X ; Y |U) = 0. There exists a convex combination P ′XU of PXU and P ′′XU such that
I(X ; Y |U) < R1 < H(X|U). Thus, the desired statement is shown.
Proof of Corollary 1: Assume that two sequences {(φn, Dn)} and {(φ′n, D′n)} of deterministic codes are
strongly secure. Then, we define the concatenation {(φ′′2n, D′′2n)} as follows. When φn(φ′n) is given as a
map fromM(M′) to X n, the encoder φ′′2n is given as a map from (m,m′) ∈M×M′ to (φn(m), φ′n(m′)) ∈
X 2n. The decoderD′′2n is given as a map from (y1, . . . , y2n) ∈ Y2n to (Dn(y1, . . . , yn), D′n(yn+1, . . . , y2n)) ∈
ML ×M′L′ . We have ǫA(φ′′2n, D′′2n) ≤ ǫA(φn, Dn) + ǫA(φ′n, D′n) because the code (φ′′2n, D′′2n) is correctly
decoded when both codes (φn, Dn) and (φ
′
n, D
′
n) are correctly decoded. Since the message encoded by
φ′′2n is correctly decoded only when both messages encoded by encoders φn and φ
′
n are correctly decoded,
we have δB(φ
′′
2n) ≤ min(δB(φn), δB(φ′n)). Alice can make cheating for the decoder D′′2n only when Alice
makes cheating for one of the decoders Dn and D
′
n. Hence, δD(D
′′
2n) ≤ min(δD(Dn), δD(D′n)). Therefore,
the concatenation {(φ′′2n, D′′2n)} is also strongly secure.
Since any distribution P satisfies the condition of Theorem 2, using the concatenated code given in
Theorem 2, we find that
Rs,d ⊃ ∪PXU{(R1, R2)|0 ≤ R1 − R2 ≤ I(X ; Y |U) ≤ R1 ≤ H(X|U), 0 ≤ R1, 0 ≤ R2}. (27)
The combination of Eq. (27) and Lemma 2 implies Theorem 1.
Proof of Corollary 2: Since D(Wx‖WP ) = D(Wx′‖WP ), we have
ζ1(P0) = min
x 6=x′
D(Wx′‖Wx) > 0. (28)
Hence, Theorem 2 implies Eq. (24).
V. PROOF OF CONVERSE THEOREM
We prepare the following lemma.
Lemma 3: For Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn), we choose the joint distribution PXn . Let Y
n = (Y1, . . . , Yn) be
the channel output variables of the inputs Xn via the channel W . Then, we have
I(Xn; Y n) ≤
n∑
j=1
I(Xj ; Yj), (29)
H(Xn) ≤
n∑
j=1
H(Xj). (30)

Proof: The relation (30) follows from
H(Xn) =
n∑
j=1
H(Xj|Xj−1) ≤
n∑
j=1
H(Xj). (31)
7To show Eq. (29), we define Xj,c := (X1, . . . , Xj−1, Xj+1, . . . , Xn). Using Y j := Y1 . . . Yj , we have
I(Xn; Y n) =
n∑
j=1
I(Xn; Yj|Y j−1) =
n∑
j=1
I(Xj,cXj ; Yj|Y j−1)
=
n∑
j=1
I(Xj; Yj|Y j−1) +
n∑
j=1
I(Xj,c; Yj|XjY j−1). (32)
In this case, we have the Markovian chain Y j−1−Xj,c−Xj−Yj . Then, we have I(Xj,c; Yj|XjY j−1) = 0.
Also, the Markovian chain Y j−1−Xj −Yj implies that I(Xj ; Yj|Y j−1) ≤ I(Xj; Yj). Hence, we have Eq.
(29).
Proof of Theorem 1: Assume that a sequence of deterministic codes {(φn, Dn)} is weakly secure. We
assume that Ri := limn→∞ 1n log |(φn, Dn)|i converges for i = 1, 2. LettingM be the random variable of the
message, we define the variables Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn) := φn(M). The random variables Y
n = (Y1, . . . , Yn)
are defined as the output of the channel W n, which is the n times use of the channel W . We define the
joint distribution PXU |n by PXU |n(x, i) := 1nPXi(x). Under the distribution PXU |n, we denote the channel
output by Y . Then, we have I(X ; Y |U) and H(X|U). When we need to describe the dependence of n,
we denote them by In(X ; Y |U) and Hn(X|U). In this proof, we use the notations Mn := |(φn, Dn)|1 and
Ln := |(φn, Dn)|2. Also, instead of ǫA(φn, Dn), we employ ǫ′A(φn, Dn) :=
∑
Mn
m=1
1
Mn
ǫA,m(φn(m), Dn),
which goes to zero.
For a code (φn, Dn), we have
log |(φn, Dn)|1
(a)
≤H(Xn) + ǫA(φn, Dn) log |(φn, Dn)|1 + log 2
(b)
≤nHn(X|U) + ǫA(φn, Dn) log |(φn, Dn)|1 + log 2, (33)
where (b) follows from Lemma 3. Dividing the above by n and taking the limit, we have
lim sup
n→∞
R1 −Hn(X|U) ≤ 0. (34)
To show (a) in (33), we consider the following protocol. After converting the message M to Xn by
the encoder φn(M), Alice sends the X
n to Bob K times. Here, we choose K to be an arbitrary large
integer. Applying the decoder Dn, Bob obtains K lists that contain up to L
K messages. Among these
messages, Bob chooses Mˆ as the element that most frequently appears in the K lists. When δC(φn, Dn) <
1 − ǫA,M(φn(M), Dn) and K is sufficiently large, Bob can correctly decode M by this method because
1 − ǫA,M(φn(M), Dn) is the probability that the list contains M and δC(φn, Dn) is the maximum of
the probability that the list contains m′ 6= M , i.e., the element M has the highest probability to be
contained in the list. Therefore, the failure of decoding is limited to the case when 1 − δC(φn, Dn) ≤
ǫA,M(φn(M), Dn), Since the average of ǫA,M(φn(M), Dn) is ǫ
′
A(φn, Dn), Markov inequality guarantees
that the error probability of this protocol is bounded by ǫ′ := ǫ
′
A(φn,Dn)
1−δC (φn,Dn) . Fano inequality shows that
H(M |Mˆ) ≤ ǫ′ log |(φn, Dn)|1 + log 2. Then, we have
log |(φn, Dn)|1 − ǫ′ log |(φn, Dn)|1 + log 2 ≤ log |(φn, Dn)|1 −H(M |Mˆ) = I(M ; Mˆ) ≤ H(Xn), (35)
which implies (a) in (33).
Now, we consider the hypothesis testing with two distributions P (m, yn) := 1
Mn
W n(yn|φn(m)) and
Q(m, yn) := 1
Mn
∑
Mn
m=1W
n(yn|φn(m)) on Mn × Yn, where Mn := {1, . . . ,Mn}. Then, we define the
region D∗n ⊂Mn×Yn as ∪m1,...,mLn{m1, . . . , mLn}×Dm1,...,mLn . Using the the region D∗n as our test, we
define ǫQ as the error probability to incorrectly support P while the true is Q. Also, we define ǫP as the
8error probability to incorrectly support Q while the true is P . When we apply the monotonicity for the
KL divergence between P and Q, dropping the term ǫP log(1− ǫQ), we have
− log ǫQ ≤ D(P‖Q) + h(1− ǫP )
1− ǫP . (36)
The meta converse for list decoding [5, Section III-A] shows that ǫQ ≤ |(φn,Dn)|2|(φn,Dn)|1 and ǫP = ǫ′A(φn, Dn).
Since Lemma 3 guarantees that D(P‖Q) = I(Xn; Y n) ≤ nIn(X ; Y |U), the relation (36) is converted to
log
|(φn, Dn)|1
|(φn, Dn)|2 ≤
I(Xn; Y n) + h(1− ǫ′A(φn, Dn))
1− ǫ′A(φn, Dn)
≤ nIn(X ; Y |U) + h(1− ǫ
′
A(φn, Dn))
1− ǫ′A(φn, Dn)
. (37)
Dividing the above by n and taking the limit, we have
lim sup
n→∞
R1 − R2 − In(X ; Y |U) ≤ 0. (38)
Therefore, combining Eqs. (34) and (38), we obtain Eq. (20).
Assume that a sequence of stochastic codes {(φn, Dn)} is strongly secure. Then, there exists a sequence
of deterministic encoders {φ′n} such that ǫA(φ′n, Dn) ≤ ǫA(φn, Dn) and δC(φ′n, Dn) ≤ δD(Dn). Since
ǫA(φ
′
n, Dn)→ 0 and δC(φ′n, Dn)→ 0, combining Eq. (20), we have Eq. (21).
VI. PROOF OF DIRECT THEOREM
Here, we prove the direct theorem (Theorem 2).
A. Preparation
To show Theorem 2, we prepare notations and basic facts. Assume that R1 and R2 satisfies the condition
22. First, given a real number R3 < R1, we fix the size of message Mn := 2
nR1 , the size of list Ln := 2
nR2 ,
and a number M′n := 2
nR3 , which is smaller than the size of message Mn. Then, we prepare the decoder
used in this proof as follows.
Definition 1 (Decoder Dφn): Given a distribution P on X , we define the decoderDφn for a given encoder
φn (a map from {1, . . . ,Mn} to X n) in the following way. We define the subset Dxn := {yn|Wxn(yn) ≥
M
′
nW
n
Pn(y
n)}. Then, for yn ∈ Yn, we choose up to Ln elements i1, . . . , iL′n (L′n ≤ Ln) as the decoded
messages such that yn ∈ Dφn(ij) for j = 1, . . . , L′n. 
For xn, xn′ ∈ X n, we define
F n(xn, xn′|P ) :=
n∑
i=1
F (xni , x
n
i
′|P ) (39)
Gn(s, xn|P ) :=
n∑
i=1
G(s, xni |P ), (40)
and define d(xn, xn′) to be the number of k such that xk 6= xk ′.
Define the functions ηAφn,ǫ1 and η
C
φn,ǫ2,R3
from Mn to {0, 1} as
ηAφn,ǫ1(m) :=
{
1 when F n(φn(i), φn(i)|P ) ≥ n(I(P,W ) + ǫ1)
0 otherwise
(41)
ηCφn,ǫ2,R3(m) :=
{
1 when ∃j 6= i, F n(φn(i), φn(j)|P ) ≥ n(R3 − ǫ2)
0 otherwise.
(42)
Since the condition in the subset Dxn′ can be written by the function F n(xn, xn′|P ), Chebychev
inequality implies that
W nxn(Dxn′) ≤
nV
[nR3 − F n(xn, xn′|P )]2+
, (43)
9where [x]+ := max(x, 0). As shown in Section VI-C, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4: For arbitrary real numbers ǫ1 > 0 and R3 < I(P,W ), we choose ǫ2 := ǫ1 +
ζ1
ζ1
(I(P,W )−
R3 + ǫ1). When a code φ˜ defined in the message set M˜n satisfies
max
m′(6=m)∈M˜n
F n(φ˜n(m), φ˜n(m
′)|P ) < n(R3 − ǫ2) (44)
F n(φ˜n(m), φ˜n(m)|P ) < n(I(P,W ) + ǫ1) (45)
for an element m ∈ M˜n, we have
δD,m(Dφ˜n) ≤
V
n(ǫ1 − ζ1
√
2V
ζ1
√
n
)2
. (46)

B. Proof of Theorem 2
To show Theorem 2, we assume that the variable Φn(m) for m ∈Mn is subject to the distribution P n
independently. Then, we have the following two lemmas, which are shown later. In this proof, we treat
the code Φn as a random variable. Hence, the expectation and the probability for this variable are denoted
by EΦn and PrΦn , respectively.
Lemma 5: When
I(P,W ) > R3, R3 ≥ R1 − R2, (47)
we have the average version of Verifiable condition (A), i.e.,
lim
n→∞
EΦn
Mn∑
m=1
1
Mn
ǫA,m(Φn, DΦn) = 0. (48)

Lemma 6: When
H(P ) > R1, (49)
for any real number ǫ2 > 0, we have
lim
n→∞
EΦn
Mn∑
m=1
1
Mn
ηCΦn,ǫ2,R3(m) = 0. (50)

In this proof, we set the parameters ǫ0, ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3, and R3 in the following way so that the conditions
in Lemmas 4, 5, and 6 are satisfied.
ǫ0 := H(P )− R1 (51)
ǫ1 :=
I(P,W )−R1 +R2
2
(52)
R3 := I(P,W )− ǫ1 (53)
ǫ2 :=
(
1 +
2ζ2
ζ1
)
ǫ1 = ǫ1 +
ζ2
ζ1
((I(P,W )−R3 + ǫ1) (54)
ǫ3 := min(
1
6
,
R1 − I(P,W )
3
). (55)
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The law of large number guarantees that
lim
n→∞
EΦn
Mn∑
m=1
1
Mn
ηAΦn,ǫ1(m) = 0 (56)
lim
n→∞
PrΦn(i)
(
D(W nΦn(i)‖W nPn) < n(I(P,W ) + ǫ3)
)
= 0, (57)
where PrX(A) expresses the probability that the condition A with respect to the variable X holds. Eq.
(57) implies
lim
n→∞
PrΦn
(
#
{
m
∣∣D(W nΦn(m)‖W nPn) < n(I(P,W ) + ǫ3)} ≥ (1− ǫ3)Mn
)
= 0. (58)
Due to Eqs. (56) and (58), and Lemmas 5 and 6, there exist a sequence of codes φn and a sequence
of real numbers ǫ4,n > 0 such that ǫ4,n → 0 and
Mn∑
m=1
1
Mn
(
ǫA,m(φn, Dφn) + η
A
φn,ǫ1(m) + η
C
φn,ǫ2,R3(m)
)
≤ ǫ4,n
3
(59)
#
{
m
∣∣D(W nφn(m)‖W nPn) < n(I(P,W ) + ǫ3)} ≥ (1− ǫ3)Mn. (60)
Due to Eq. (59), Markov inequality guarantees that there exist 2Mn/3 elements M˜′n := {m1, . . . , m2Mn/3}
such that any element m ∈ M˜′n satisfies
ǫA,m(φn, Dφn) + η
A
φn,ǫ1(m) + δB(φn) ≤ ǫ4,n, (61)
which implies that
ǫA,m(φn, Dφn) ≤ ǫ4,n, δB(φn) ≤ ǫ4,n (62)
ηAφn,ǫ1(m) = η
C
φn,ǫ2,R3(m) = 0 (63)
because ηAφn,ǫ1 and η
C
φn,ǫ2,R3
take value 0 or 1. Since 1/6 ≥ ǫ3, Eq. (60) guarantees that the number of m
that does not satisfy the following condition (64) is at most Mn/6;
D(W nφn(m)‖W nPn) < n(I(P,W ) + ǫ3). (64)
Hence, we can choose Mn/2 elements M˜n := {m1, . . . , mMn/2} from M˜′n to satisfy the condition (64)
because |M˜′n| − |M˜n| = Mn/6. Now, we define a code φ˜n on M˜n as φ˜n(m) := φn(m) for m ∈ M˜n.
Thus, for m 6= m′ ∈ M˜n, we have
ǫA,m(φ˜n, Dφ˜n) ≤ ǫA,m(φ˜n, Dφn) ≤ ǫ4,n (65)
δB(φ˜n) ≤ ǫ4,n (66)
F n(φ˜n(m), φ˜n(m
′)|P ) < n(R3 − ǫ2) (67)
F n(φ˜n(m), φ˜n(m)|P ) < n(I(P,W ) + ǫ1). (68)
Therefore, Lemma 4 guarantees Non-cheating condition for dishonest Alice (D), i.e.,
δD,m(Dφ˜n) ≤
V
n(ǫ1 − ζ2
√
2V
ζ1
√
n
)2
. (69)
In the code φ˜n, Eq. (64) implies that
I(Xn; Y n) ≤ n(I(P,W ) + ǫ3). (70)
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Using the formula given in [16, Theorem 4][17, Lemma 4], we have
δB(φ˜n) ≤
( ∑
m∈M˜n
2
Mn
W n
φ˜n(m)
({
yn
∣∣ logW n
φ˜n(m)
(yn)− logW nPn(yn) ≥ n(I(P,W ) + 2ǫ3)
}))
+
2 · 2n(I(P,W )+2ǫ3)
Mn
. (71)
Also, we have
W n
φ˜n(m)
({
yn
∣∣∣ logW nφ˜n(m)(yn)− logW nPn(yn) ≥ n(I(P,W ) + 2ǫ3)
})
(a)
≤W n
φ˜n(m)
({
yn
∣∣∣∣∣ logW nφ˜n(m)(yn)− logW nPn(yn)−D(W nφ˜n(m)‖W nPn)
∣∣ ≥ nǫ3
}) (b)
≤ V
nǫ23
, (72)
where (a) follows from Eq. (64) and (b) follows from Chebychev inequality. Since 2·2
n(I(P,W )+2ǫ3)
Mn
=
2·2n(R1−ǫ3)
Mn
→ 0, the combination of (71) and (72) implies that δB(φ˜n)→ 0. Since RHSs of (65) and (69)
go to zero, we obtain the desired statement.
C. Proof of Lemma 4
Now, we assume that an element xn ∈ X n satisfies
ǫA,m(x
n, Dφ˜n) ≤
1
2
. (73)
Then,
1
2
≤ (1− ǫA,m(xn, Dφ˜n))
(a)
≤ W nxn(Dφ˜n(m))
(b)
≤ nV
[nR3 − F n(xn, φ˜n(m)|P )]2+
, (74)
where (a) follows from the definition of Dφ˜n (Definition 1) and (b) follows from Eq. (43).
Hence, we have
nR3 − F n(xn, φ˜n(m)|P ) ≤
√
2nV . (75)
Thus,
nR3 −
√
2nV
(a)
≤ F n(xn, φ˜n(m)|P )
(b)
≤F n(φ˜n(m), φ˜n(m)|P )− d(xn, φ˜n(m))ζ1
(c)
≤n(I(P,W ) + ǫ1)− d(xn, φ˜n(m))ζ1, (76)
where (a), (b), and (c) follow from Eq. (75), the combination of the definitions of ζ1 and d(x
n, φ˜n(m)),
and Eq. (45), respectively.
Hence,
d(xn, φ˜n(m)) ≤ n(I(P,W )−R3 + ǫ1) +
√
2nV
ζ1
. (77)
Thus, for m′ ∈ M˜n, we have
nR3 − F n(xn, φ˜n(m′)|P )
(a)
≥ nR3 − F n(φ˜n(m), φ˜n(m′)|P )− ζ2d(xn, φ˜n(m))
(b)
≥nǫ2 − ζ2d(xn, φ˜n(m))
(c)
≥nǫ2 − ζ2
ζ1
(n(I(P,W )−R3 + ǫ1) +
√
2nV )
(d)
=nǫ1 − ζ2
ζ1
√
2nV , (78)
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where (a), (b), (c) and (d) follow from the combination of the definitions of ζ1 and d(x
n, φ˜n(m)), Eq.
(44), Eq. (77), the choice of ǫ2 respectively.
Thus, we have
δC,m(x
n, Dφ˜n)
(a)
= max
m′ 6=m
W nxn(Dφ˜n(m′))
(b)
≤ max
m′ 6=m
nV
(nR3 − F n(xn, φ˜n(m′)|P ))2
(c)
≤ nV
(nǫ1 − ζ2ζ1
√
2nV )2
=
V
n(ǫ1 − ζ2
√
2V
ζ1
√
n
)2
, (79)
where (a), (b), and (c) follow from the definition of δC,m (Eq. (6)), Eq. (43), and Eq. (78), respectively.
D. Proof of Lemma 5
To show (48), we employ an idea similar to [16], [17].
Lemma 7: We have the following inequality;
ǫA(Φn, DΦn) ≤
Mn∑
i=1
1
Mn
(
WΦn(i)(DcΦn(i)) +
∑
j 6=i
1
Ln
WΦn(i)(DΦn(j))
)
. (80)

Proof: When i is sent, there are two cases for incorrectly decoded. The first case is the case that the
received element y does not belong to DΦn(i). The second case is the case that there are more than Ln
elements i′ to satisfy y ∈ DΦn(i′). The error probability of the first case is given in the first term of Eq.
(80). The error probability of the second case is given in the second term of Eq. (80).
Using Lemma 7, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 8: We have the following inequality;
EΦnǫA(Φn, DΦn) ≤
∑
xn∈Xn
P n(xn)
(
W nxn(Dcxn) +
Mn − 1
Ln
W nPn(Dxn)
)
. (81)

Applying Lemma 8, we have
EΦnǫA(Φn, DΦn)
≤EXnW nXn
({
yn
∣∣ logW nXn(yn)− logW nPn(yn) < nR3})
+ EXn2
n(R1−R2)W nPn
({
yn
∣∣ logW nXn(yn)− logW nPn(yn) ≥ nR3}). (82)
Taking the limit, we obtain Eq. (48).
E. Proof of Lemma 6
Due to Lemma 1 and Eq. (49), we can choose s such that −R1 + s(R3 − ǫ2) > G(s|P ). We set
ǫ5 :=
1
2
(−R1 + s(R3− ǫ2)−G(s|P )) > 0. We define two conditions An,i and Bn,i for the encoder Φn as
An,i G
n(s,Φn(i)|P ) < n(−R1 + s(R3 − ǫ2)− ǫ5).
Bn,i ∃j 6= i, F n(Φn(i),Φn(j)|P ) ≥ n(R3 − ǫ2).
When An,i holds, for j 6= i, Markov inequality implies that PrΦn(j)|Φn(i)
(
F n(Φn(i),Φn(j)|P ) ≥ n(R3 −
ǫ2)
)
≤ 2Gn(s,Φn(i)|P )−sn(R3−ǫ2), where PrΦn(j)|Φn(i) is the probability for the random variable Φn(j) with
the fixed variable Φn(i). Hence, under this condition, we have
PrΦn,i,c|Φn(i)(Bn,i) ≤ 2nR1−12G
n(s,Φn(i)|P )−sn(R3−ǫ2) ≤ 2Gn(s,Φn(i)|P )−sn(R3−ǫ2)+nR1 ≤ 2−nǫ5, (83)
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where Φn,i,c expresses the random variables {Φn(j)}j 6=i. Now, PrΦn(An,i|Bn,i) expresses the probability
that the condition An,i holds under the condition that the condition Bn,i holds. Then, we have
PrΦn(An,i|Bn,i) ≤ 2−nǫ5. (84)
Thus, we have
EΦn
Mn∑
m=1
1
Mn
ηCΦn,ǫ2,R3(m)
=
1
Mn
EΦn |{i|Bn,i holds. }| =
Mn∑
i=1
1
Mn
PrΦn(Bn,i)
≤
Mn∑
i=1
1
Mn
(PrΦn(An,i)PrΦn(Bn,i|An,i) + (1− PrΦn(An,i)))
(a)
≤2−nǫ5 +
Mn∑
i=1
1
Mn
(1− Pr(An,i)), (85)
where (a) follows from Eq. (84).
The random variable Gn(s,Φn(i)|P ) can be regarded as the n-fold i.i.d. extension of the variable
G(s,X|P ) whose expectation is G(s, P ). Since the choice of ǫ5 guarantees that
G(s, P ) < −R1 + s(R3 − ǫ2)− ǫ5, (86)
we have
1− PrΦn(An,i) = PrΦn
(
Gn(s,Φn(i)|P ) ≥ n(−R1 + s(R3 − ǫ2)− ǫ5)
)
→ 0. (87)
Hence, the combination of Eqs. (85) and (87) implies the desired statement.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a new concept, secure list decoding, which has additional requirements for the
conventional list decoding. This scheme has three requirements. Verifiable condition, Non-decodable
condition, and Non-cheating condition. Non-cheating condition has two versions. One is the condition
for honest Alice (sender). The other is the condition for dishonest Alice. Since there is a possibility that
Alice use a different code, we need to guarantee the impossibility of cheating even for such a dishonest
Alice. In this paper, we have shown the existence of a code to satisfy these three conditions. Also, we
have defined the capacity region as the possible rate pair of the rates of the message and the list, and
have derived the capacity region under a proper condition. Also, we have constructed a protocol for bit
commitment from the secure list decoding. However, it is not trivial to construct secure list decoding from
bit commitment. This direction is an interesting open problem.
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